This is the chapter four of Occupy Vision, which is the second volume of the three volume set titled Fanfare for the Future. In coming days we will post the book’s eight chapters. You can find out more about Occupy Theory, Occupy Vision, and Occupy Strategy, as well as how to purchase the books in print or for ebook reading, at Z’s book page for them – which is at: https://zcomm.org/the-fanfare-series/
“When someone with the authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and saw nothing.”
– Adrienne Rich
In discussing visions for gender relations we have in mind a good society’s procreation, nurturance, socialization, sexuality, and organization of daily home life with a special eye on three dimensions of implications: relations between women and men, between homo and heterosexuals, and between members of different generations.
“In my heart, I think a woman has two choices:
either she’s a feminist or a masochist.”
– Gloria Steinem
A problem with having this discussion, is that there is as yet very little clarity about what revolutionized kinship relations will be like in a new society. What altered or new institutions will organize procreation, nurturance, and socialization? How will the structures and social roles we fill to accomplish upbringing and home life change so as to eliminate the roots of gender and sexual hierarchies.
Our values imply that accomplishing kinship functions should enhance solidarity among the involved actors, preserve diversity of options and choices, apportion benefits and responsibilities fairly, and convey self managing influence – taking into account issues of age, etc.
So with that set of broad desires, will there be families as we now know them? Will upbringing diverge greatly from what we know now? What about courting and sexual coupling? How will the old and young interact? How will adults react with the elderly and the young?
Fulfilling our values will require that desirable kinship structures liberate women and men rather than causing the former to be subordinate to the latter, and likewise for other hierarchical or degrading relations.
We are therefore talking about removing the features that produce systematic sexism, homophobia, and ageism, plus gaining an array of positive improvements we can only guess at until we have experimented with more complete proposals for visionary kinship institutions. But these will, at the very least, include the benefits of additional people reaching their fullest potentials.
It isn’t that all problems associated with gender will disappear in a good society, of course, or that all unmet desires or un-manifested capacities will be perfectly addressed without any pain. Even in a wonderful society, we can confidently predict that there will still be unrequited love. Sex will not lack turmoil. Rape and other violent acts will occur, albeit far less often than now. Social change can’t remove the pain of losing friends and relatives to premature death. It can’t make all adults equally adept at relating positively with children or with the elderly or vice versa.
What we can reasonably expect and demand, however, is that new forms of engagement will eliminate the systematic violation of women, gays, children, and the elderly which causes these whole groups to suffer material or social deprivations.
We can demand that innovations eliminate the structural coercion of men and women, of hetero and homosexuals, and of all adults and children into patterns that have for so long manifested and preserved systematic violations of solidarity, diversity, equity, and self management.
How will all this happen? Not how will we get to this better future, which is a derivative and even more difficult question that we will take up later in volume three of Fanfare, but what will the institutions defining a vastly better kinship future look like?
Some people have good ideas, no doubt, but we have to admit that we have barely an inkling about this visionary question. Indeed, we can find very little in the way of a proposed answer in the contemporary literature of the left. In the past some women have attempted to provide some visionary sex-gender insights and we would like to mention some of those attempts as being worth trying to elaborate into a gender related vision.
In contemporary societies that elevate men by consigning women to less empowering and fulfilling options, what are the defining structures that intrinsically produce a sexist ordering and therefore need to be profoundly altered to remove that ordering?
Sexism takes overt form in men having dominant and wealthier conditions. It takes more subtle form via longstanding habits of communication and behavioral assumptions. It is produced and reproduced by institutions that differentiate men and women, including coercively as in rape and battering, but also more subtly via what seem to be mutually accepted role differences in home life, work, and celebration. It also includes the cumulative impact of past sexist experiences on what people think, desire, and feel, and on what people habitually or even self consciously do.
If we want to find the source of gender injustice it stands to reason that we need to determine which social institutions – and which roles within those institutions – give men and women responsibilities, conditions, and circumstances, that engender motivations, consciousness, and preferences that elevate men above women.
One structure we find in all societies that have sexist hierarchies is that men father but women mother. That is, we find two dissimilar roles which men and women play vis a vis the next generation, with each role socially defined and in only a very minor sense biologically fixed. One conceptually simple structural change in kinship relations would be to eliminate this mothering/fathering differentiation between men and women.
What if instead of women mothering and men fathering, women and men each parented children? What if men and women each related to children in the same fashion, with the same mix of responsibilities and behaviors (called parenting), rather than one gender having almost all the nurturing as well as tending, cleaning, and other maintenance tasks (called mothering), and the other gender having many more decision-based tasks, with one gender being more involved and the other more aloof, and so on?
We are not highly confident that replacing gender defined mothering and fathering with gender-blind parenting would eliminate all the defining roots of sexism, but we do think this is likely to be a key innovation critical to removing the underlying causes of sexist hierarchies.
This particular idea comes from the work of Nancy Chodorow, most prominently in a book titled, The Reproduction of Mothering (University of California Press). The book made a case that mothering is a role that is socially, not biologically, defined and that as mothers women produce daughters who, in turn, not only have mothering capacities but a desire to mother. “These capacities and needs,” Chodorow continues, “are built into and grow out of the mother-daughter relationship itself. By contrast, women as mothers (and men as not mothers) produce sons whose nurturant capacities and needs have been systematically curtailed and repressed.”
For Chodorow, the implication was that:
“The sexual and familial division of labor in which women mother and are more involved in interpersonal affective relationships than men produces in daughters and sons a division of psychological capacities which leads them to reproduce this sexual and familial division of labor.”
Chodorow summarized by claiming that:
“All sex-gender systems organize sex, gender, and babies. A sexual division of labor in which women mother organizes babies and separates domestic and public spheres. Heterosexual marriage, which usually gives men rights in women’s sexual and reproductive capacities, and formal rights in children, organizes sex. Both together organize and reproduce gender as an unequal social relation.”
So perhaps one feature of a vastly improved society regarding gender relations will be that men and women will both parent, with no division between mothering and fathering.
Another structure that comes into question for many feminists thinking about improved sex-gender relations is the nuclear family. This is hard to even define, I think, but has to do with whether the locus of child care and familial involvement is very narrow, such as resting with only two biological parents, or instead involves many more people – perhaps an extended family or friends, community members, etc.
It seems highly unlikely that a good society would have for its gender relations rules that required a few typical household organizations and family structures such that everyone must abide only those. We wouldn’t expect that adults would, by law, have to live alone or in pairs or in groups, in any single or even in any few patterns. The key point is likely to be diversity, on the one hand, and that whatever diverse patterns exist, each frequently chosen option embodies features that impose gender equity rather than gender hierarchy.
While we don’t feel equipped to describe such possible features, we can say that the men and women that are born, brought up, and then themselves bear and bring up new generations in a new and much better society will be full, capable, and confident in their demeanor and also lack differentiations that limit and confine the personality or the life trajectories of either – whether to some kind of narrow feminine or narrow masculine mold.
The same can be said, broadly, about sexuality and intergenerational relations. We don’t think we know or,arguably, even have a very loose picture of what fully liberated sexuality will be like in all its multitude of preferences and practices, or what diverse forms of intergenerational relations adults and their children and elders will enter into. What we think we can say, however, is that in future desirable societies no few patterns will be elevated above all others as mandatory, though all widely chosen options will preclude producing in people a proclivity to dominate, to rule, to subordinate, or to obey, based either on sexual orientation, age, or any other social or biological characteristic, for that matter.
We have very little idea what specific sex-gender patterns will emerge, multiply, and continually develop in a better future. For example, monogamous or not, hetero, homo, or bi-sexual, and involving transformed care giving institutions, families, schools, and perhaps other political and social spaces for children as well as for adults and the elderly. But we can guess with confidence that actors of all ages and genders, engaging in non oppressive consensual sexual relations, will be free from stigma.
All the above is vague and modestly formulated. Will renovated kinship include the broad structural features intimated above? We don’t know. We certainly believe future kinship will be very diverse, at any rate. But even without knowing the inner attributes of new institutions for family life and related interactions and while waiting for kinship vision to emerge more fully from feminist thought and practice, we can still say some useful things about these domains’ relations to economics and polity, and vice versa.
Visionary Kinship and Society
“[History is the] quarrels of popes and kings, with wars
or pestilences in every page; the men all so good for nothing,
and hardly any women at all.”
– Jane Austen
Kinship institutions are necessary for people to develop and fulfill their sexual and emotional needs, organize daily life, and raise new generations of children. But current kinship relations elevate men above women and children, oppress homosexuals, and warp human sexual and emotional potentials.
In a humanist society we will eliminate oppressive socially imposed definitions so that everyone can pursue their lives as they choose, whatever their sex, sexual preference, and age. There will be no non-biologically imposed sexual division of labor with men doing one kind of work and women doing another simply by virtue of their being men and women, nor will there be any hierarchical role demarcation of individuals according to sexual preference. We will have gender relations that respect the social contributions of women as well as men, and that promote sexuality that is physically rich and emotionally fulfilling.
It is likely, for example, that new kinship forms will overcome the possessive narrowness of monogamy while also allowing preservation of the depth and continuity that comes from lasting relationships. New forms will likely destroy arbitrary divisions of roles between men and women so that both sexes are free to nurture and initiate. They will likely also give children room for self-management even as they also provide the support and structure that children need.
But what will make all this possible?
Obviously women must have reproductive freedom – the freedom to have children without fear of sterilization or economic deprivation, and the freedom not to have children through unhindered access to birth control and abortion. There can be no more compromising on this issue than we can have compromising about private ownership of the means of production. Just as private ownership abrogates the rights of employees to control and direct their laboring capacities, denial of birth control and abortion abrogates the rights of women to control and manage their reproductive capacities and, thereby, their lives in general.
But feminist kinship relations must also ensure that child-rearing roles do not segregate tasks by gender and that there is support for traditional couples, single parents, lesbian and gay parenting, and more complex, multiple parenting arrangements. All parents must have easy access to high quality day-care, flexible work hours, and parental leave options. The point is not to absolve parents of child-rearing by turning over the next generation to uncaring agencies staffed mainly by women (or even women and men) who are accorded low social esteem. The idea is to elevate the status of child rearing, encourage highly personalized interaction between children and adults, and distribute responsibilities for these interactions equitably between men and women and throughout society.
After all, what social task could be more important than rearing the coming generation of citizens? So what could be more irrational than patriarchal ideologies that deny those who fill this critical social role the status they merit? In a desirable society, kinship activity must not only be arranged more equitably, but the social evaluation of this activity must be corrected as well.
Feminism should also embrace a liberated vision of sexuality respectful of individual’s inclinations and choices, whether homosexual, bisexual, heterosexual, monogamous, or non-monogamous. Beyond respecting human rights, the exercise and exploration of different forms of sexuality by consenting partners provides a variety of experiences that can benefit all. In a humanist society that has eliminated oppressive hierarchies, sex can be pursued solely for emotional, physical, and spiritual pleasure and development, or, of course, as part of loving relationships. Experimentation to these ends will likely not merely be tolerated, but appreciated.
We need a vision of gender relations in which women are no longer subordinate and the talents and intelligence of half the species is free at last. We need a vision in which men are free to nurture, childhood is a time of play and increasing responsibility with opportunity for independent learning but not fear, and in which loneliness does not grip as a vice whose handle turns as each year passes.
A worthy kinship vision will reclaim living from the realm of habit and necessity to make it an art form we are all capable of practicing and refining. But there is no pretense that all this can be achieved overnight. Nor is there reason to think a single kind of partner-parenting institution is best for all. While the contemporary nuclear family has proven all too compatible with patriarchal norms, a different kind of nuclear family will no doubt evolve along with a host of other kinship forms as people experiment with how to achieve the goals of feminism.
Economics and Women and Men
“If divorce has increased by one thousand
percent, don’t blame the women’s movement.
Blame the obsolete sex roles on which marriages were based.”
– Betty Friedan
Capitalist economics is more subtle than some critical analysts think vis a vis women and men. There is, in fact, nothing in the defining institutions of capitalism – private ownership of productive property, corporate divisions of labor, authoritative decision making, and markets – that even notices – much less differentiates and hierarchically arrays – men and women due to a strictly economic dynamic and logic. On the other hand, if a society’s sex gender system produces a differentiation between men and women, capitalist economy will not ignore that reality but will, indeed, accommodate it or even co-reproduce it, as discussed in the first volume of Fanfare.
Thus, if men and women are arrayed by familial and other kinship relations so that the former have expectations of relative dominance over the latter, capitalist economy will operate in light of this situation.
Suppose an employer seeks to hire a manager. If the workforce is predominately male and a woman and a man apply, and the woman has better credentials and is more suited to the actual tasks involved, in a sexist society the man is far more likely to get the job even if the employer has no gender biases at all.
The reason is because the employer needs the male workforce to feel obedient and subordinate to the manager, and the manager to feel authoritative and superior to the workforce. It is far less likely for this pattern to emerge against the preconceived sexual orderings of society than it is for the sought pattern to emerge in accord with those orderings. In other words, the corporate division of labor typically uses, rather than subverts, the gender hierarchy established by familial and kinship relations.
Similarly, pay patterns will reflect the differential bargaining power that sexism imposes on men and women. Men, all other things equal, will be able to extract more pay for the same work than women, due to owners exploiting the subordinate position and lesser bargaining power of women.
These are the minimal accommodations of capitalist economies to sexist kinship relations. Capitalism’s hierarchies don’t challenge and largely incorporate gender hierarchies. Women disproportionately occupy subordinate positions. Women earn less. From this emerges the distressing details including the tremendous incidence of female poverty, ill health, and rape and other violence that we all by now know about.
It is important to realize that there is, however, a deeper impact of the field of force of sexist hierarchy on economic relations. The styles and patterns of male and female behavior produced by a patriarchal sex gender system can impose on economic roles so that production, consumption, and allocation begin to literally incorporate the features of kinship rather than only accommodating or exploiting them.
In other words, women’s economic jobs can take on attributes of nurturance and care giving and maintenance which are in no sense required by or even entirely logical in light of only economic dictates, and similarly for men’s roles taking on male patterns also imposed by kinship definitions – even contrary to purely economic logic.
In this case we will see jobs in the economy that both reflect and, very importantly, actively reproduce male and female behavior imposed by a patriarchal sex gender system. The economy then becomes complicit in reproducing or co-reproducing sexism.
Parecon and Parpolity’s Impact
“When we consider that women have been treated as property, it is degrading to women that we should treat our own children as property to be disposed of as we see fit.”
– Elizabeth Cady Stanton
In parecon, however, reproduction of sexist relations emanating from a patriarchal sex gender system disappears. It isn’t just that a participatory economy works nicely alongside a liberated kinship sphere. It is that a parecon precludes or at least militates against non-liberated relations among men and women. Parecon unravels sexism.
A parecon will not give men relatively more empowering work or more income than women because it cannot provide such advantages to any group relative to any other.
Balanced job complexes and self management need and seek adults able to engage in decisions and to undertake creative empowering labor, regardless of gender or any other biological or social attribution. If kinship relations press for other results, there is a contradiction and either kinship or economy must give way to the other.
There is no process of a parecon that is functioning properly abiding hierarchies born in gender relations because there are no hierarchies in a parecon that can abide it. Women cannot earn less than men, nor have jobs that are less empowering, nor have less say over decisions.
But what about household labor? Many feminists will, at this point, ask the question, “parecon claims to remove the differentiation at work and in income required by contemporary sexism, but is household labor part of the economy?”
Our inclination is to say that there is no one right answer to this question, just as for most questions beyond issues of core defining relations. In other words, we can imagine a society that treats household labor of diverse types as part of its participatory economy and we can imagine one that doesn’t. With our current state of understanding, we would prefer the latter type, for a few reasons. But neither choice is ruled out or made inevitable, purely by the logic of parecon.
Beyond that logical openness, however, we tend to think household labor shouldn’t be considered part of the economy subject to the norms of productive labor.
First, nurturing and raising the next generation is not like producing a shirt, stereo, scalpel, or spyglass. There is something fundamentally distorting, to our thinking, about conceptualizing child care and workplace production as being the same type of social activity.
The second reason we think household labor should not be counted as part of economic production is that the fruits of household labor are largely enjoyed by the producer him/herself. Should I be able to spend more time on household design and maintenance and receive more remuneration as a result? If so, I get the output of the work and I get more income, too. This is different than other work and it seems to us that changing the design of my living room or keeping up my garden is more like consumption rather than production.
Suppose I like to play the piano, or build model airplanes, or whatever. The activity I engage in for my hobby has much in common with work, but we call it consumption because I do it under my own auspices and for myself. What we call work, in contrast, is what we do under the auspices of workers councils to produce outputs that are enjoyed by people other than just ourselves.
Is there a problem with saying that because caring for and raising children is fundamentally different in kind than producing cars or screwdrivers, or that maintaining a household is different in its social relations and benefits than working in a factory, and deducing that on these bases we shouldn’t count household labor as work to be remunerated and occur under the auspices of parecon’s workplace institutions?
I guess if we think it is impossible to have a transformation of sex-gender relations themselves, then there is a problem, yes. If the norms and structures of households and living units are highly sexist, and if a parecon doesn’t incorporate household labor as part of the economy and subject it to parecon’s norms, then household labor may be done overwhelmingly by women and will, as a result, reduce their leisure or their time for other pursuits relative to men.
But why assume that? Why shouldn’t it be that transformed norms for household labor are produced by a transformation of sex gender relations themselves, rather than by calling household labor part of the economy?
Take it in reverse. If this were a book about feminism and the rest of society and if I had mapped out a feminist sex-gender vision, I don’t think many people would ask whether we can count the workplace as a household so that it gets the benefits of the innovative relations that new families and living units have. We would assume, instead, that there would need to be a revolution in the economy, not just in kinship, and we would rely on the former for the chief redefinitions of life at work, even as we also anticipated and required that the economy abide and even abet the gains in kinship, and even as we worked to ensure that the gains of each meshed compatibly with the other.
In any event, clearly a parecon mitigates sexism because on the one hand it would have no reason to and even could not incorporate sexist hierarchies, and on the other hand it empowers and remunerates women in a manner that precludes their being easily subordinated in any other realm
The situation with polity is even more simple and straightforward. Of course legislative and other structures would not favor one gender versus another. And laws would be consistent with feminist kinship, as feminist kinship must nurture and socialize people capable of participatory self managing political relations. So the polity will have laws, constitutional and otherwise, guaranteeing the character of political relations is consistent with and even reproductive of the feminist benefits of new kinship relations, and vice versa.
Perhaps it is the paucity of our understanding showing, but other than in direct analogy to the above discussion, we honestly don’t see a deeper relation of economics or politics and sexuality. If there is homophobia or other sexual hierarchies in a society, and if the economy is capitalist, then the economy will – to the extent owners are able to do so – exploit whatever differentials in bargaining power they are handed. A typically top-down polity will also, at least, reflect and often exacerbate those differentials. Beyond this, however, the capitalist economy and any authoritarian polity may also incorporate gay and straight behavior patterns into economic roles, consumption patterns, etc. With parecon and parpolity, however, no exploitation of sexual difference is even possible – much less enacted in the economy – because there is one norm of remuneration and one logic of labor definition that applies to everyone and which, by their very definition, foreclose options of hierarchy, while the polity derives from and thus reflects and protects the will of men and women schooled by feminist relations.
More positively, it seems to me that whatever liberated sexuality will mean in a future society it can only be hastened and abetted by economic and political relations that bestow on actors self managing power and just allocations, thereby tending to generate actors expecting to be creative, initiating, and self managing in other spheres of their lives than just the economic.
What about intergenerational conflict? Capitalism will always exploit age differentials for profit via diminished remuneration for the young and old due to these constituencies’ reduced bargaining power. It will take advantage of different capacities related to age for exploitative divisions of labor and will rush premature labor entry or slower than warranted labor withdrawal, for exploitative reasons. A parecon, however, will not only promote humane behaviors as being in every participant’s interests – and, in any event, the only permissible way of being – but will make violations impossible due to being contrary to defining parecon norms and structures. In a parecon, there is no way to exploit age-based differences because there is no way to accrue advantage. Similarly a parpolity will likewise protect and incorporate the will of people of all ages, as self management permits nothing less.
Societies will decide the role of the elderly including retirement age, and likewise for young people’s entry into economic and political responsibility as part of parpolity decision making. While familiar and other extra-economic intergenerational relations will certainly not be governed solely by economic or political structures and will arise, instead, due to a host of variables including new kinship and gender forms, the fact that a parecon and a parpolity require developed and fully participatory and self managing actors imposes on life more generally a respect for all actors and gives all actors material equality and behavioral wherewithal and habits contrary to any kind of subordination emanating from any other of society’s institutions.
We don’t yet fully know what liberating gender, sexual, and intergenerational relations will be like but we can say parecon and parpolity would appear likely to be quite compatible and even nurturing of them, just as they would nurture and socialize young people into preparedness for self managing economic and political life. Before long, hopefully further kinship vision for basic relations will exist and this claim and parecon and parpolity – along with feminist kinship – can be further elaborated, tested, or refined, as need be.